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The Curious Case of Computer-Generated Works under the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988 





Under section 9(3) of the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, works that are ‘computer-
generated’ (and which have no human author) will be protected by copyright. Ownership of the 
copyright vests in the person who has made the necessary ‘arrangements’ for the work’s creation. This 
article introduces two questions in relation to section 9(3). Firstly, how does the section fit with 
copyright’s originality requirement? Secondly, what is the justification for the provision? In exploring 
these questions the article develops a novel criticism of section 9(3): the section is either unnecessary 
or unjustifiably extends legal protection to a class of works which belong in the public domain. While 
previous literature has praised section 9(3) and suggested that it ought to be adopted more widely, this 
article concludes that other jurisdictions ought to think carefully before adopting this provision.  
 
 









On the 25th of October, 2018, the famous art auction house, Christie’s, sold a portrait called 
Portrait of Edmond de Belamy1. The impressionistic-style work displays a young man with 
dark hair wearing a jacket. Described as such, the portrait sounds unremarkable. However, 
when the gavel eventually fell, the portrait sold for $432,500; a figure far in excess of the pre-
auction valuation of $7,000 to $10,000. The reason for this hefty sum was that Edmond de 
Belamy is far from unremarkable; rather it is the first artwork of artificial intelligence to be sold 
at an auction house. To create the work, a French collective known as Obvious Art used a 
publicly accessible machine learning algorithm2. The trio fed the algorithm 30,000 portraits to 
analyse. After the training period, the algorithm produced Edmond as part of a series of 
portraits. Obvious Art selected an appropriate frame for the work, and decided to add a short 
string of code to the painting in the bottom right corner, to serve as a signature. 
 The case of Edmond de Belamy is one example of the fast-growing area of art 
produced by machine learning. Works of machine learning have recently received significant 
interest from copyright lawyers. There now exists a burgeoning literature analysing such 
works, seeking to answer whether the works are eligible for copyright protection and, if so, 
who is the owner of such works3. Under traditional principles of copyright law, the author of a 
copyright-eligible work is the first owner (with some exceptions for works produced by 
employees)4.  Naturally, this raises the question of who, if anyone, is the ‘author’ of works like 
                                               
1 Gabe Cohn, ‘AI Art at Christie’s Sells for $432,500’ (The New York Times, 29 October 2018) < 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/arts/design/ai-art-sold-christies.html> accessed 28 January 2020. 
2 For a general introduction to the technical workings of machine learning, see Gopinath Rebala et al, 
Introduction to Machine Learning (Springer 2019) 1-5. 
3 See e.g. Enrico Bonadio and Luke McDonagh, ‘Artificial Intelligence as Producer and Consumer of Copyright 
Works: Evaluating the Consequences of Algorithmic Creativity’ (2020) 20 Intellectual Property Quarterly 112; 
Andres Guadamuz, ‘Do Androids Dream of Electric Copyright? Comparative Analysis of Originality in 
Artificial Intelligence Generated Works’ (2017) 2 I.P.Q. 169; Jane Ginsburg and Luke Budiardjo, ‘Authors and 
Machines’ (2019) 34 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 343. 





Edmond? Traditionally the ‘author’ is understood as the creator of the work, i.e. the person 
who supplies the necessary ‘original’ expression5. But who is that person in this context? Is 
the author the coder who produced the machine learning algorithm (a 19 year old by the name 
of Robbie Barrat6)? Are the members of Obvious Art, who conceived the idea of a machine 
learning portrait and used the algorithm to produce such a work, authors of the work? Is the 
work authorless? Or, most controversial of all, is it fair to call the algorithm itself the author of 
the work? Across multiple jurisdictions, scholars are currently debating this question.  
 Against this international backdrop, UK copyright law is an outlier. While most countries 
are debating who, if anyone, counts as the ‘author’ of machine-learning works, the UK has, 
since 1988, adopted a unique statutory provision designed to avoid such questions. Under 
section 9(3) of the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act (CDPA), when a work has ‘no human 
author’ and is instead ‘computer-generated’7, the ‘author’ will be taken to be the person who 
made ‘arrangements necessary for the creation of the work’. That individual will receive 
economic rights in the work, but not moral rights8. Currently within the UK, the focus of debate 
is largely centred on the question of which party can be said to have made the necessary 
‘arrangements’ for the work: the algorithm’s programmer or the algorithm’s user (if they are 
different people)9? But, for the most part, the section has been well-received. Illustrative here 
are the views of Andres Guadamuz. While acknowledging the uncertainty still inherent in the 
provision, Guadamuz argues the law clarifies the status of computer-generated works, and on 
that basis ought to be ‘adopted more widely’10. And the provision is indeed being adopted 
                                               
5 Lionel Bently, Brad Sherman, Dev Gangjee, Phillip Johnson, Intellectual Property Law (OUP 2018) 126-127 
(‘Basically, in order for someone to be classified as an author, it is necessary for them to be able to show that 
their contribution to the work is of the type and amount that is protected by copyright – that is, that the 
contribution would be sufficient to confer originality on the relevant work’). 
6 Cohn (n 1). 
7 CDPA s 178 (providing the definition of ‘computer-generated work’). 
8 CDPA ss 77 - 95. 
9 Guadamuz (n 3) at  175-177. 





more widely, with countries like New Zealand11 and Ireland12 copying the model, and 
commentators in the USA13 and Australia14 also expressing interest.  
 This article, by contrast, is critical of section 9(3) and the UK model of protection. The 
purpose of this article is to raise two questions about the computer-generated works clause 
which have so far received little attention in the academic literature. The first question may be 
called the ‘doctrinal question’. How does section 9(3) fit within the system of copyright and 
associated rights in the UK, and in particular, with the originality doctrine? The second 
question may be called the ‘justification question’. The justification question asks what is the 
basis, rationale, or justification for section 9(3)? This is not quite the same as asking whether 
computer-generated works ought to be protected by copyright (a subject upon which many 
lawyers have already written15). Rather our inquiry is a more limited one, i.e.: Is the precise 
form of protection offered by section 9(3) desirable? 
 In exploring these two questions, the article unpacks a novel criticism of section 9(3). 
The central thesis of the article is that either the computer-generated works clause is 
meaningless, or if it has meaning, that meaning is of dubious normative value. As a doctrinal 
matter, it is not clear where section 9(3) fits within the system of rights created by the CDPA. 
In particular, it is not clear whether such works require originality to enjoy protection. If, as is 
most likely, such works are subject to an originality requirement, then section 9(3) is 
                                               
11 Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand) s 5(2)(a). 
12 Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (Ireland) s 21(f). 
13 Annemarie Bridy, ‘Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author’ (2012) 5 Stanford 
Technology Law Review 26-27. 
14 Jani McCutcheon, ‘The Vanishing Author in Computer-Generated Works: A Critical Analysis of Recent 
Australian Case Law’ (2012) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 915. 
15 See e.g. Robert Denicola, ‘Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated Works’ (2016) 69 
Rutgers University Law Review 251 (arguing that such works should receive protection), Bruce Boyden, 
‘Emergent Works’ (2016) 39 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 377 (arguing that such works should 
receive protection when the computer’s output was reasonably foreseeable). Cf US Copyright Office, 
Compendium of US Copyright Office Practices §306 (3d ed 2014) (denying copyright protection to works not 





meaningless. The section is meaningless because the person who supplies the necessary 
originality would be considered a human author of the work. As a result, not only is the work 
not truly a computer-generated work, but also that author would be entitled to claim full 
copyright in the normal manner. Alternatively, section 9(3) may be understood as an exception 
to the originality requirement. Perhaps the section creates a type of neighbouring rights 
protection which extends copyright-like exclusivity to works which are not original. In this case 
the clause is not meaningless but it is lacking justification. Why should non-original computer-
generated works be protected at all instead of falling into the public domain? Very little 
justification has so far been offered for this outcome. 
 The article will first demonstrate the doctrinal ambiguity of section 9(3) and how it does 
not fit neatly into any of the categories of protection created by the CDPA. Once that doctrinal 
ambiguity is exposed, the article turns to the justification question demonstrating that the 
section is either redundant or lacking justification. The analysis concludes that the provision 
should not be adopted more widely in other jurisdictions. And should the thesis fail to convince, 
engaging with it at least will shed light on the section and bring us closer to understanding 
what it could mean and what it could not. 
I. The Doctrinal Question 
Under UK copyright law, a literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic work (hereinafter called ‘LDMA 
works’)  may qualify for copyright protection if it is ‘original’16. Unlike the novelty requirement 
in patent law, ‘originality’ refers to a particular type of relationship between the person claiming 
authorship of the work and the work itself17. The nature of the ‘originality’ requirement is 
contested. Under EU copyright law, the necessary relationship will exist if the work is the 
‘author’s own intellectual creation’18. This threshold will be passed if the author makes ‘free 
                                               
16 CDPA s 1(1)(a). 
17 Bently (n 5) at 93. 





and creative choices’19 that imprint her ‘personal touch’20 upon the work. The EU originality 
standard replaced older British conceptions of originality (although the degree to which the 
new standard replaced old law remains a debated point21). Prior to the 2009 Infopaq case 
announcing the ‘authorial intellectual creation’ standard, the leading conception of originality 
stated that the work would be original if its creation was the product of sufficient ‘skill, labour 
and judgment’ of the right kind22. It is an open question whether the UK will return to the ‘skill, 
labour and judgment’ standard, or a variant of it, after departure from the EU23. If the work is 
eligible for copyright, the author (i.e. the person who supplies the originality) will be entitled to 
both economic and moral rights in the work for her lifetime plus 70 years24.  
 Films, sound recordings, broadcasts and typographical arrangements (so called 
‘entrepreneurial works’25) are not subject to an originality requirement. Such works receive 
copyright protection so long as they are ‘not copied’ from a pre-existing work26. However, the 
copyright protection in such works is ‘thin’. The duration of copyright protection is shorter than 
is available for LDMA works – typically between 25 and 75 years protection post creation27. 
The rights available in such works are also restricted. With the exception of films, moral rights 
typically do not vest in the creator of an entrepreneurial work28. Furthermore, the economic 
                                               
19 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH and Others Case C-145/10 [2012] ECDR 6 
20 ibid. 
21 See Andrea Rahmatian, ‘Originality in UK Copyright Law: The Old ‘Skill and Labour’ Doctrine Under 
Pressure’ (2013) 44(1) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 4. See also Temple 
Island Collects Ltd v New English Teas Ltd [2012] EWPCC 1 [20] (per HHJ Birss) (indicating that despite the 
difference in language there was little difference of approach between the two jurisdictions). 
22 Interlego AG v Tyco Industries Inc (1989) AC 217; Ladbroke v William Hill [1964] 1 All ER 465. Of course, 
the British case law on originality is complex and not easy to summarise in one sentence. The article will later 
discuss the origination element of British originality doctrine.  
23 See e.g. Richard Arnold, Lionel Bently, Estelle Derclaye, Graeme Dinwoodie, ‘The Legal Consequences of 
Brexit Through the Lens of IP Law’ (2017) 101 Judicature 65. 
24 CDPA s 12. 
25 Bently (n 5) at 118; CDPA ss 5A(2), 5B(4), 8(2). 
26 CDPA ss 5A(2), 5B(4), 8(2). 
27 CDPA ss 13-15. 





rights in such works are limited (for example, typically they do not benefit from an exclusive 
right of adaptation29). 
 Lastly, in addition to copyright, a number of ‘related rights’ exist which are associated 
with copyright, but nevertheless fall outside of copyright. The oldest such related right is the 
‘performers’ right’30. Those who perform copyrighted works (such as a pianist playing a 
musical work, or an actor reading aloud a dramatic work) enjoy a variety of rights in their 
performance (including the right to authorise the recording of a performance, the right to make 
copies of the recording, the right to rent or communicate the recording to the public, and moral 
rights)31. More recently, the EU has added related rights for the creators of databases32 and 
for press publishers33. Much like the protection for entrepreneurial works, these activities do 
not need to be original in order to enjoy related right protection. However, such related right 
protection is frequently conditional upon achieving an alternative threshold test. For example, 
database right protection can only be obtained if the database in question was the product of 
substantial investment34. Like entrepreneurial rights, the term of protection is shorter than for 
LDMA works (for example, the performers’ right lasts for 50 years post recording)35.  
 In which category do ‘computer-generated works’ belong? Does section 9(3) create: 
a) a legal provision governing computer-generated copyrightable LDMA works, b) a new 
category of copyrightable entrepreneurial work, or c) a new type of non-copyright related right? 
The answer to this question is hardly trivial for the potential rights-holders, as the scope of 
protection they receive will vary depending on the answer to this question. Furthermore, the 
answer to this question will determine whether putative owners of computer-generated works 
will need to show ‘originality’ in order to receive legal protection. As the rest of this section 
                                               
29 CDPA s 21. 
30 CDPA s 180. 
31 CDPA ss 182 – 184. 
32 Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases (1996).  
33 Directive 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, art 15 (2019). 
34 Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases art 7 (1996). 





discusses, without further law-making (either judicial or legislative) section 9(3) does not 
clearly sit within any of the three categories.  
1. Option A: Computer-Generated Works are Authorial LDMA works 
 The most plausible interpretation is that section 9(3) does not create a new category 
of entrepreneurial work or a new related right, but simply adds some specific legal rules for 
LDMA works which are ‘computer-generated’. If this is how we understand section 9(3), then 
presumably the works still need to pass the originality threshold (as is the case with all other 
LDMA works)36. Under this interpretation of the clause, if the work passes the originality 
threshold, then presumably the work will be protected, and the economic rights (but not moral 
rights) will vest in the person who made the necessary arrangements for the work.  
There are some good reasons to view this as the ‘right’ interpretation of section 9(3). 
The clearest reason is that the text of the statute clearly says that the section only applies to 
‘literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic’ works – works which will be protected by copyright but 
only if they are original. Further support for this interpretation comes from the only case to so 
far interpret section 9(3). In Nova Productions Ltd v. Mazooma Games, Jacob LJ decided that 
the person who had made the ‘arrangements necessary’ for the work, was the person who 
had contributed ‘skill or labour of an artistic kind’37. At the time the case was decided (2007), 
the standard for originality in the UK was not ‘authorial intellectual creation’ but instead ‘skill 
or labour of an artistic kind’38. Accordingly, it seems that Jacob LJ interpreted ‘arrangements 
necessary’ as synonymous with the originality requirement, suggesting that the originality 
threshold is relevant when determining who ought to own the work. 
 Furthermore, the legislative history behind section 9(3) adds further support for this 
interpretation. Prior to the passage of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, the Whitford 
                                               
36 CDPA s 1(1)(a). 
37 Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd & Ors [2006] EWHC 24 (Ch) (para 106). 





Committee’s report Copyright and Designs Law of 197739 and the government 1981 green 
paper, Reform of the Law relating to Copyright, Designs and Performers’ Protection40, both 
considered the question of copyright in computer-generated works. After considering these 
reports and the public responses, the Department of Trade and Industry issued a white paper 
on Intellectual Property and Innovation in 198641. The white paper concluded that there may 
be three potential ‘authors’ of such works: the creator of the programme, the originator of the 
data which the computer uses to create the new work, and the person responsible for running 
the computer. The white paper, after considering responses to the 1981 green paper, found 
that ‘no practical problems arise from the absence of specific authorship provisions’ in respect 
to computer-generated works, and thus that ‘no specific provisions should be made to 
determine this question’42. The report concluded its discussion on this point by saying that the 
‘question of authorship of works created with the aid of a computer will therefore be decided 
as for other categories of copyright work, i.e. on the basis of who, if anyone, has provided the 
essential skill and labour in the creation of the work’43. If ‘no human skill and effort has been 
expended then no work warranting copyright protection has been created’44. Thus, the 
legislative history suggests further that computer-generated works remain subject to the 
originality requirement. 
 However, there is a significant problem with this interpretation: it is inherently 
contradictory. In order for a computer-generated work to pass the originality threshold, then 
there must be a human author supplying the necessary originality (hence why LDMA works 
                                               
39 Whitford Committee, ‘Copyright and Designs Law: Report of the Committee to consider the Law on 
Copyright and Designs’ (March 1977). 
40 ‘Reform of the Law relating to Copyright, Designs and Performers’ Protection: A Consultative Document’ 
(1981). 
41 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ‘Intellectual Property and Innovation’ (April 1986). 
42 ibid at 51.  






are commonly known as ‘authorial works’45). But if there is a human author supplying the 
necessary originality, then the work is clearly not computer-generated under the terms of the 
legislation. Furthermore, the author who supplies the necessary originality would be able to 
claim copyright (including moral rights) in the normal manner. This point can be put in the form 
of a syllogism: originality requires human authorship; in order to be protected, computer-
generated works require originality; ergo computer-generated works require human 
authorship to be protected. Of course, the soundness of this argument depends on the truth 
of the first premise, i.e. that originality necessarily requires human authorship. So let us now 
shore up that assertion.  
 Under EU copyright law, originality clearly requires human authorship. A LDMA work 
is only original if it is the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’46. The case law’s references to 
personality and personal touch suggest strongly that this standard requires a natural person. 
This interpretation has been further supported by Advocate-General Trstenjak in the Painer 
case who stated that ‘only human creations’ are protected (although this can include ‘persons 
who employ a technical aid, such as a camera’47). Numerous scholars have concluded that 
under EU copyright, there must be a human author supplying originality and this may exclude 
computer-generated works from the realm of copyright protection48.  
 Under the older British standard of ‘skill, labour, and judgement’ human authorship is 
equally necessary. Assuming that there is no general artificial intelligence, we would all largely 
agree that skill, labour, and judgement are characteristics that can only be exhibited by 
humans. It is very difficult to imagine how a computer may satisfy the requirement that its 
output is the result of ‘skill’, for example. And there is no puzzle why the older British standard 
                                               
45 See e.g. Bently (n 5) 36 (distinguishing ‘authorial works’ from ‘entrepreneurial works’). 
46 Infopaq (n 18) 
47 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH, Case C-145/10 [2011] ECDR (13) 297, 324 [AG121]. 
48 Guadamuz (n 3) at 178; Ana Ramalho, ‘Will Robots Rule the (Artistic) World? A Proposed Model for the 
Legal Status of Creations by Artificial Intelligence Systems’ (2017) Journal of Internet Law 1, 8; Timothy Pinto, 
‘Robo ART! The Copyright Implications of Artificial Intelligence Generated Art’ (2019) 30 Entertainment Law 





of originality necessarily assumes human authorship. The judges who created this standard 
were operating in a world where, due to technological capabilities, non-human creativity was 
largely the province of science fiction. Consequentially, the doctrine that elaborates upon the 
nature of this standard is replete with references to authors49. 
 But perhaps we are not so constrained by history. Perhaps we could redefine the 
concept of originality in relation to computer-generated works in a way that excises the 
necessary requirement of human authorship. One such strategy, for example, may be to say 
that a computer-generated work is ‘original’ if it is ‘new’ and different from anything that came 
before it (regardless of whether a human author was involved or not).50 However, doing so 
would take us into ‘Humpty Dumpty territory’. ‘When I use a word’ Humpty Dumpty famously 
said, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less’51. But most lawyers would 
agree that Humpty Dumpty’s approach to language is deeply flawed. Words have meaning 
and are not subject to redefinition at whim. In this case, nearly all IP lawyers would agree that 
the concept of originality cannot be satisfied by a demonstration that the work is new; that is 
a showing of novelty (as found in patent law), not originality. And nor is this merely a 
conceptual problem, but it also has practical implications. There are good reasons why we do 
not require novelty in copyright: the purpose of the law is to encourage and to reward creativity, 
not novelty and innovation. In sum, this is not a plausibly coherent conceptualisation of the 
originality test with which computer-generated works would necessarily need to comply under 
this interpretation. 
 Alternatively, perhaps we could redefine originality in this area to mean ‘not copied’52. 
We could consider a computer-generated work to be original if it is the result of independent 
                                               
49 See e.g. University of London Press v University of Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601, 609 (the act requires that 
the work should ‘originate from the author’)(per Peterson J), cited in Interlego (n 22) at 259-260; L.B. (Plastics) 
Ltd. v Swish Products Ltd. [1979] R.P.C. 551, 567 (the skill and labour standard requires a work be ‘original in 
the sense that it is all the author’s own work’) (per Whitford J) cited in Interlego (n 22) at 262. 
50 Bently (n 5) 117. 
51 Lewis Carrol, Through the Looking Glass (1978, London Galaxy Books) 168. 





acts of the computer and is thus not copied from an existing source (regardless of the presence 
or absence of a human author). But this approach faces the same problem as the last one, 
i.e. it leaves us in Humpty Dumpty territory. A ‘not copied’ standard may, in some ways, be 
closer to an originality standard than a novelty requirement, but it is still not a plausibly 
coherent conceptualisation of originality as required by the CDPA. This can be demonstrated 
easily by considering entrepreneurial works. Such works do not need to be original in order to 
be protected, but they do need to be ‘not copied’53. Clearly the CDPA scheme envisions the 
‘not copied’ standard as something distinct from, and different to, originality. And, if we start to 
re-imagine the ‘not copied’ standard as a type of originality, we are left in the strange position 
that entrepreneurial works require a type of originality in order to gain protection, despite their 
being no statutory basis for this outcome. Of course, there has been some confusion on the 
relationship of the ‘not copied’ standard and originality in the distant past. Peterson J in 
University of London Press v University Tutorial Press suggested that originality could be 
satisfied if a work was not copied, but instead originated from the author54. But this standard 
has not been favoured for many years (around a century) because of the obvious flaw that it 
does not provide lawyers with any information about when a work can be said to ‘originate’ 
from an author55. Under the CDPA as it exists today, therefore, a showing that a computer-
generated work is ‘not copied’ would not be enough to demonstrate originality. 
 It seems therefore that section 9(3) cannot be a provision which simply further defines 
the rules regarding copyrightability of computer-generated LDMA works. Such an 
interpretation would be inherently contradictory because it would require said works to pass 
                                               
53 See e.g. Bently (n 5) 118 (‘Unlike the case with literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works (authorial 
works), there is no requirement that films, sound recordings, broadcasts or published editions be original. 
Instead, the CDPA 1988 provides that copyright does not subsist in a sound recording, a film, or a published 
edition to the extent that it is itself copied from a previous work of the same kind.’).  
54 [1916] 2 Ch 601, 609. In many ways,  the ‘not copied’ standard adopted in this case was a hangover from the 
case of Walter v Lane [1900] AC 539, 551-2 (per Lord Davey) which introduced the ‘not copied’ / ‘origination’ 
standard as a requirement of authorship (prior to the introduction of a statutory originality requirement). 





an originality threshold. But the only plausibly coherent originality thresholds (i.e. authorial 
intellectual creation, or skill, labour and judgement) both necessarily involve human 
authorship. Therefore, in order to be a computer-generated work, there would need to be no 
human author, but in order for that work to be protected, there would need to be an author 
supplying the necessary originality. Simply put, there is no way the current section 9(3) 
provision can be subject to an originality requirement without becoming incoherent56.  
2. Options B and C: Entrepreneurial Works or Neighbouring Rights 
 Perhaps, then, section 9(3) simply creates a new category of entrepreneurial work? 
Like sound recordings and films, computer-generated works do not need to be ‘original’ in 
order to be protectable by copyright. And there is some support for this interpretation in the 
academic literature. Guadamuz, for example, calls the provision an ‘exception’ to the originality 
requirement57 – suggesting that either the statute creates a new type of entrepreneurial work 
or a related right; both of which are currently exceptions to the originality requirement. 
Furthermore, if we were to adopt a ‘not copied’ threshold for computer-generated works, then 
we would surely be closer to an understanding of computer-generated works as a new form 
of entrepreneurial works. 
  This interpretation, however, can be dismissed pretty quickly, as it is even more flawed 
than the prior one. Section 9(3) clearly states that the provision is limited to LDMA works. The 
statute does not envision a new category of works (such as sound recordings or typographical 
arrangements), but instead envisions an old category of work (i.e. LDMA works) created in a 
new manner. The words of the statute make it clear that section 9(3) does not create a new 
category of copyrightable works. If it did do so, that new category would need to be added to 
the list of protectable works enumerated in section 1; which Parliament clearly did not do.  
 Perhaps then section 9(3) simply creates a new related right? Perhaps like performers 
                                               
56 The incoherency in the statute existed from the moment that section 9(3) was enacted. While AI technology 
has developed significantly since 1988, the incoherency of the statutory scheme has been a constant. The 
conceptual problems caused by subjecting putatively authorless works to an originality standard have always 
existed. 





and database creators, the person who makes the necessary ‘arrangements’ for the 
production of a computer-generated LDMA work deserves some sort of legal protection, albeit 
protection that falls short of copyright. However, once again, this is hardly a satisfactory 
interpretation of section 9(3). Nowhere does the statute say that it is creating a related or 
neighbouring right. In fact, the statute seems to make it fairly obvious that the person making 
the ‘arrangements necessary’ will receive copyright rather than a related right. Section 9(3) of 
the act comes directly under the heading ‘Authorship and Ownership of Copyright’. The section 
is embedded in a set of textual provisions allocating copyright ownership, rather than creating 
new rights associated with copyright. All other LDMA works receive copyright rather than 
related rights. Section 9(3) states that the person who makes the necessary ‘arrangements’ 
will be the ‘author’ and section 11 makes clear that all authors of protectable (i.e. original) 
LDMA works receive copyright. In sum, the provision does not seem to create a related right 
either.  
 
II. The Justification Question 
Not only is the clause ambiguous (perhaps incomprehensibly so), but it is not clear whether 
the provision is justifiable. A number of scholars have debated whether computer-generated 
works ought to receive copyright protection58. But this is not precisely the question we will be 
posing here. Our question is subtly, but importantly, different. The question is whether the 
precise form of protection envisioned by section 9(3) is justifiable. On this point, I remain 
dubious. This particular provision is either redundant or extends protection to a class of works 
which probably ought to be in the public domain. 
Literature which has so far praised the provision seems to emphasize legal certainty. 
The advantage of the provision is that it, allegedly, clarifies the legal status and ownership of 
works created by computers59. Indeed, the legislative history behind the provision suggests 
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that legal certainty is its chief advantage60. However, clearly the provision does not do a 
particularly good job at creating legal certainty. Scholars have already pointed out that 
identifying the individual who has made the necessary ‘arrangements’ is a difficult and 
uncertain analysis61. But I want to go further than that. As the analysis above demonstrates, it 
is not clear at all where the provision fits within the copyright system or how it relates to the 
originality requirement. In effect, I remain unconvinced that the provision has greatly clarified 
the legal status of computer-generated works. And yet the problems do not stop there.  
 Let us assume for the time being that the provision does not create a new category of 
copyrightable entrepreneurial work, nor create a related right, but instead simply modifies 
existing rules relating to LDMA works when they are computer-generated. If this is the right 
way to interpret the provision, then the provision is simply unnecessary.  Anyone claiming the 
benefit of the provision would necessarily need to show that the work is original, lest they risk 
losing protection for not complying with section 1(1)(a) of the statute. But as discussed above, 
the only coherent conceptions of originality necessarily assume the existence of a human 
author. Assuming there is an author who can supply the necessary originality to pass the 
threshold, then that person would be entitled to claim to be an author of a human-authored 
work and to acquire both economic and moral rights in the traditional manner. Alternatively, if 
they cannot pass the originality threshold, then the work is not an original LDMA work and not 
eligible for any protection. This begs the question, why have this section at all? We would be 
in exactly the same position if we had created no new provision, but instead simply stuck to 
the traditional copyright principle that copyright is only obtainable if an author creates an 
original LDMA work. We do not need to debate whether computer-generated works need 
encouragement or not, to recognise that a provision which merely duplicates a principle found 
elsewhere in existing copyright law is redundant.  
 Alternatively, consider the situation if we understand section 9(3) as creating a new 
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category of entrepreneurial work or creating a new neighbouring right. If the computer-
generated work does involve original expression, then the contributor of that originality (the 
author) is far more likely to claim authorial copyright rather than rely on the thin level of 
protection that entrepreneurial works or neighbouring rights receive. In this case, the provision 
would once again seem redundant. On the other hand, the provision would have a meaningful 
effect in cases where the work is not capable of passing the originality threshold. Like other 
entrepreneurial works or neighbouring rights, the possible impact of section 9(3) would be to 
extend copyright (or copyright-like) protection to a class of non-original works. But this raises 
the important question: why ought these works to be protected at all rather than fall into the 
public domain? In this case, section 9(3) is not meaningless, but it is of dubious normative 
value. 
The originality doctrine in copyright law plays a vital filtering role62, and should not be 
bypassed without strong justification. Originality is a normative threshold63. Works which are 
original are works which tend to take time and effort to create, and which are imbued with the 
author’s personality. Accordingly, original creative works of authors generally deserve 
copyright protection for both utilitarian and natural rights reasons. Works which do not pass 
the originality threshold (e.g. single words64, stick-figure drawings), do not deserve the 
protection of a legal monopoly – such protection is not necessary to encourage their creation 
and the creators generally have no legitimate claims in morality to ownership of the resulting 
work. For the most part, there is no reason to depart from the normal rules of free market 
competition in such cases, and they ought not to be subject to a legally enforced monopoly. 
For this reason, we generally should be sceptical about a provision that may extend copyright 
to non-original computer-generated works. Indeed, there are strong reasons to be sceptical of 
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any new copyright, even for original works.65 
Of course, there are legitimate exceptions to the originality requirement. During the 
twentieth century, it was generally agreed that some non-original works may nevertheless 
deserve copyright protection. For example, databases which require ‘substantial investment’ 
may be under-produced by the market without legal exclusivity, and for utilitarian reasons, 
may enjoy justifiable protection even when they are non-original.66 Similarly, many would 
agree that performers have a natural right to control recordings of their performances.67 Even 
if performers do not create any ‘original’ creative work, their performances would seem to 
capture an important part of their personality.   
However, do any of these justifications apply in the case of non-original computer-
generated works? If we are utilitarian about the matter, is there any evidence at all that the 
free market will ‘fail’ us here, and that such works will be under-supplied? I have yet to see 
any. Indeed, the economics of computer-generated works points in the other direction. If 
anything, new artificial intelligence technology is making it easier and cheaper to create new 
work, and thus undercutting the need for legal monopoly as a means of recovering high fixed 
cost investment68. As the fixed costs of using AI to create new works decreases, so too does 
the rationale for providing copyright in the resulting works. Perhaps, like the sui generis 
database right, we could limit protection to those instances where the work requires 
‘substantial investment’69. But the current law is clearly not so limited. Of course, the matter is 
different with original computer-generated works, which rightly would receive copyright 
                                               
65 See Stephen Breyer, ‘The Unease Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
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67 Cf Mathilde Pavis, The Author-Performer Divide in Intellectual Property Law: A Comparative Analysis of 
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68 See e.g. CEO of Amper Music (an AI music platform) explaining how Amper makes it possible for 
individuals not trained in music to become creators, Drew Silverstein, The Greatest Creative Revolution in the 
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protection without section 9(3) in the normal manner. 
Alternatively, is there any compelling natural rights-based reason for granting 
copyright-like protection to non-original computer-generated works (akin to the way we grant 
performers rights in order to protect their personality)? Of course, I can see clear natural rights 
based reasons to grant copyright protection to original computer-generated works. The author 
who supplies that originality deserves protection as recompense for their creativity and labour 
just as any other author would. But I do not see any natural rights reason why we ought to 
expand protection to computer-generated works which do not involve originality. These are 
works which, by definition, do not involve sufficient personality to achieve the ‘authorial 
intellectual creation’ standard, and as a result, do not present a strong personality justification 
for protection.70 They are also works which do not meet the skill, labour and judgement 
standard, and for which there is no Lockean labour justification for protection.71 Even if section 
9(3) created legal certainty, such legal certainty is not desirable when its effect is to extend 
protection (even of the thin variety) to works that should not be protected in the first place. 
 Lastly, one might argue that, if non-original computer-generated works are not 
protected, then the retail price of such works sold commercially would be low, and such works 
would undercut the market for human-authored works.72 But it is not clear why this is a bad 
thing for society. In utilitarian theory, copyright is a necessary evil. Copyright restricts what 
people can do with creative works and introduces scarcity where there is none. We put up 
with such restrictions to the extent they are necessary to encourage creative works; without 
this mechanism we would under-supply such works and society would be left with unfulfilled 
demand73. However, the argument above assumes that it is possible to have a thriving market 
of creative works produced by computers in absence of copyright. If that is true, then we have 
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a situation where demand is being successfully fulfilled (i.e. there is no market failure) without 
the encouragement of a legal monopoly. In such a world, the whole justification for copyright 
of any kind falls away. Why provide humans with legal monopolies over creative works at all, 
if computers will fulfil the demand without the need for such restrictive legal measures? 
Unfortunately for some, there is nothing special about human-authorship in utilitarian theory.  
And, for sake of completeness, nor should we be overly-concerned about authors’ 
natural property rights in such a scenario. If non-original computer-generated works are 
ineligible for copyright, authors of human-authored works would still be able to claim copyright 
in their original creations. Their moral claim to control how their works are used would be 
protected by those rights. The copyright they receive in such circumstances would protect their 
personality and labour, just as it does now. The profits authors earn, of course, may decrease 
in the face of competition from artificially created works. But a natural property right is not a 
guarantee of income; it merely secures the author the ability to control how their work is used.  
 
Conclusion 
I have sympathy for the drafters of section 9(3) of the CDPA. Legislation is rarely perfect. 
Arguably the role of judges is to interpret provisions creatively to show them in their best light74. 
And it is certainly plausible that original computer-generated works deserve the protection of 
copyright in some way. Yet, this particular mode of providing said protection throws up a lot 
more questions than it answers. It should not, therefore, be ‘adopted more widely’75. Instead, 
jurisdictions should consider very carefully before duplicating this provision within their own 
laws. At the very least, they ought to first address the question that UK lawyers have yet to 
answer, i.e.: How does the provision fit with the originality requirement?  
If anything, the UK ought to consider abolishing section 9(3). The most plausible 
interpretation is that this provision was meant to clarify certain rules regarding the ownership 
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of copyright in computer-generated LDMA works, and that such works, like all other LDMA 
works, must be original in order to be protected. If that is how we are to interpret the provision, 
then we are in a strange position where the section applies to works which putatively have no 
human author, but which are only capable of protection if they are the original creation of an 
author. Not only is this inherently contradictory, it also highlights how unnecessary the 
provision is. If computer-generated works need to be original to receive protection, then 
section 9(3) is redundant, because these works would have received protection any way under 
traditional copyright principles. The only way section 9(3) is not redundant is if we agree that 
it is not subject to the originality requirement. But in this case, the effect of the provision is to 
expand protection to non-original computer-generated works. Yet there is no compelling 
natural rights or utilitarian reason for doing so.  
In sum, UK law would be on firmer footing if, like most other jurisdictions, computer-
generated works were subject to the traditional rules of copyright, i.e. they can be protected 
by copyright (for life plus 70 years including economic and moral rights) if they are the original 
creative work of an author; if they do not pass that threshold, then they would be better off in 
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